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ABSTRACT
Is there any need to “clean” up a banking system in the midst of a crisis, by closing or recapitalizing
weak banks and taking bad assets off bank balance sheets, or can one wait till the crisis is over? We
argue that an “overhang” of impaired banks that may be forced to sell assets soon can reduce the current
price of illiquid assets sufficiently that weak banks have no interest in selling them. Anticipating a
potential future fire sale, cash rich buyers have high expected returns to holding cash, which also reduces
their incentive to lock up money in term loans. The potential for a worse fire sale than necessary, as
well as the associated decline in credit origination, could make the crisis worse, which is one reason
it may make sense to clean up the system even in the midst of the crisis. We discuss alternative ways
of cleaning up the system, and the associated costs and benefits.
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In early 2009, the supply of credit in industrial countries appeared to be tightening substantially. Clearly 
credit quality deteriorates in a recession, which might suggest why banks were reluctant to lend. But 
lending across the quality spectrum seemed to fall in the last quarter of 2008, with new loans to 
investment grade borrowers down as much as new loans to below investment grade borrowers (Ivashina 
and Scharfstein (2009)).  And, of course, the recessionary conditions themselves may not have been 
independent of bank lending.
1 
In what might seem a separate development, banks at that time also held on to large quantities of 
“Level 2” and “Level 3” assets – assets that were not frequently traded and for which the price was either 
based on models or largely hypothetical. In many cases, these were assets such as mortgage backed 
securities, for which a liquid market had existed, but where trading had dried up. The popular view was 
that there was a “buyers strike”, as investors who traditionally had bought these assets had been seared by 
past negative returns and return volatility, and had abandoned these markets. Of course, an immediate 
question is why new “vulture” investors would not be attracted to these markets – the notion of a “buyers 
strike”, at least over more than a few days, seems difficult to countenance. After all, there is always a 
price at which anything with positive value can be sold.  
One explanation is that the banks themselves expected the value of these assets to rise and were 
reluctant to sell. This too seems implausible, at least prima facie. Why should banks have different 
expectations from the market, especially since the underlying factors driving the fundamental value of 
these securities, such as the state of housing markets, were common knowledge among those with 
expertise in trading mortgage backed securities?  Another explanation is that banks were reluctant to 
recognize losses on these illiquid securities, since that would require writing down capital. Yet many of 
these banks had substantially more book capital than required by regulators. Moreover, the market could 
                                                            
1 For overviews of the financial crisis, see Adrian and Shin (2008), Brunnermeier (2008), Caballero and 
Krishnamurthy (2009), Diamond and Rajan (2009), and Gorton (2009). 2 
 
see the quantity of impaired assets held on bank balance sheets, and must have incorporated estimates of 
their value into equity prices.   It is implausible to argue that bank management were eager to create 
uncertainty about the true value of their balance sheets, with the additional discount in equity valuation 
that would be implied, than to sell assets and remove uncertainty.
2   
We argue in this paper that the seizing up of term credit and the overhang of illiquid assets in 
distressed institutions may not be coincidental; they may have common roots, and have potential 
explanatory power beyond the Crisis of 2007-2010. The intuition is simple. Let a set of banks have a 
significant quantity of assets that have a limited set of potential buyers.  One example of such an asset is a 
mortgage backed security which, in an environment where some mortgages have defaulted, can be valued 
accurately only by some specialized firms. Furthermore, let us assume that with some probability, the 
banks will need to realize cash quickly in the future. Such a need for liquidity may stem from unusual 
demands of the banks’ customers, who draw on committed lines of credit or on their demandable 
deposits.  It may also stem from panic, as depositors and customers, fearing a bank could fail, pull their 
deposits and accounts from the bank. Regardless of where the demand for liquidity comes from, it would 
force banks to sell assets or, equivalently, raise money, quickly. Given that the limited set of potential 
buyers or lenders for the bank’s assets have limited resources, the asset would have to be sold at fire sale 
prices (as in Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Allen and Gale (1994)).     
  One consequence of the fire sale is that it may depress asset values so much that the bank is 
insolvent. This may precipitate a run on the bank, which may cause more assets to be unloaded on the 
market, further depressing the price.  Equally important, the returns to those who have liquid cash at such 
times can be extraordinarily high.  
                                                            
2 Of course, one possibility is that what was going on was a form of forbearance -- if banks recognized all the losses, 
they would go below the regulatory minimum. Therefore, regulators were willing to suspend disbelief about asset 
quality so long as banks did not sell assets and make it impossible for regulators to continue the charade. Given that 
the authorities were attempting to get banks to clean up their balance sheets, and were willing to recapitalize banks 
up to a point, this explanation does not seem to us the most obvious one.  3 
 
Folding back to today, the prospect of a future fire sale of the bank’s asset can depress its current 
value  – investors need to be enticed through a discount to buy the asset today, otherwise they have an 
incentive to hold back because of the prospect of buying the asset cheaper in the future. More generally, 
the high returns potentially available in the future to those who hold cash today can cause them to demand 
a high return today for parting with that cash today.  
This is similar to standard dynamic asset pricing in financial markets and in markets with 
imperfect arbitrage such as Vayanos-Gromb (2002) or Kondor (2009), where future returns influence 
current required returns.  But the elevated required rate of return now extends to the entire segment of the 
financial market that has the expertise to trade the security. If this segment also accounts for a significant 
fraction of the funding for potential new loans, the elevated required rate of return will be contagious and 
will spread to lending.  Illiquidity can depress lending – a feature that may be absent in models where 
future asset values are uncertain for other reasons. Moreover, the institutional overhang will affect lending 
not only by distressed banks but also by healthy potential lenders, a feature that distinguishes this 
explanation from those where the reluctance to lend is based on the poor health of either the bank or its 
potential borrowers.    
More surprising though, the bank’s management, knowing that the bank could fail in some states 
in the future, do not have strong incentives to sell the illiquid asset today, even though such sales could 
save the bank. The reason is simple. By selling the asset today, the bank will raise cash that will bolster 
the value of its outstanding debt by making it safer. But in doing so, the bank will sacrifice the returns 
that it would get if the currently depressed value of the asset recovers. Indeed, because the states in which 
the depressed asset value recovers are precisely the states in which the bank survives, bank management 
would much rather prefer holding on to the illiquid assets and risking a fire sale and insolvency than 
selling the asset and ensuring its own stability in the future. This idea is clearly analogous to the risk 
shifting motive in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the underinvestment motive in Myers (1977), though 4 
 
the bank “shifts” risk or under invests in our model by refusing to sell an illiquid asset than by taking on, 
or not taking on, a project.  
The ingredients of our model are illiquidity and its effects on pricing combined with the 
unwillingness of the potentially insolvent owners of equity to take actions equivalent to buying costly 
insurance.  These are well understood issues.  What is new in our analysis is how they interact to produce 
the phenomenon we try to explain.  Illiquidity can influence future and thus current returns, but when it 
leads to the potential insolvency of sellers it can cause the sellers to be unwilling to sell assets today at the 
price that buyers will pay, thus exacerbating the potential insolvency in the future and the associated price 
decline. 
Our simple model predicts that illiquid banks will be on a “seller’s strike.”  Sellers hold on, not 
because the available market price is irrationally low compared to its value in the near future, but because 
the alternative of holding on is more beneficial. The “ask” price it would take to get the bank to sell assets 
is too high given the price potential buyers will bid. Sales of the illiquid asset therefore dry up.   
Our point is very general, and applies beyond this specific crisis. It holds whenever a set of 
privately owned distressed levered institutions hold any asset (loans, land, securities) that could 
potentially have a thin future market. These impaired institutions not only act as an overhang over the 
market, elevating required rates of return and further increasing financial fragility, but will also risk future 
insolvency by holding on to the assets, further depressing the market. Thus, there is an inherent source of 
adverse feedback in any financial crisis, which is why cleaning up the financial system may be an 
important contributor to recovery. 
To unfreeze asset and credit markets, the authorities will have to move the holdings of potentially 
illiquid assets by distressed institutions into safer hands – potentially by forcing timely sales which 
effectively force the distressed institutions to purchase insurance, or by increasing the capacity of 
potential buyers to buy those assets. They can also remove the overhang of distressed institutions by 5 
 
recapitalizing them. By stabilizing the financial system and eliminating the possibility of fire sales, the 
authorities can eliminate the potential for high returns to be made in the market in the future, and increase 
the relative profitability of lending today, thus increasing its magnitude.  
In section I, we present the model. In section II, we examine the sources of illiquidity; in section 
III we explore extensions to the model to show how the possibility of a market freeze is general. In 
section IV we explore the effects of several government interventions, especially forced sales.  In section 
V, we relate the paper to the literature, including papers by Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2009), Allen, 
Carletti and Gale (2009), Allen and Gale (1994, 1998, 2000, 2003), Allen and Carletti (2008), 
Bhattacharya and Gale (1988), Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2008), Diamond and Rajan (2005), 
Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen ( 2009), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Shleifer and Vishny (1992, 
2009), and Stein (2009). We will describe the relationships once we have described our model.  We 
conclude in section V. 
I.  The Model 
A set of identical banks at date 0 each owns financial assets  (for example, mortgage backed 
securities) that will be worth Z at date 2. The bank is financed with demand deposits (or overnight paper) 
of face value D, with Z D  .
3  For now assume each bank has a local monopoly on financing and can 
raise a fixed quantity of deposits if it pays an interest rate of 0 (We discuss other motivations for the 
bank’s fixed cost of raising deposits, including possible anticipated government bailouts of depositors or 
some long-term debt in section II).  Depositors can demand repayment at date 1 or date 2.   Everyone is 
risk neutral.  We assume until section III that Z is a constant, which means that the assets are not risky 
when held to maturity.   The model’s primary implications are clear in this simple setting. 
                                                            
3 For a model of why this might be the optimal form of financing for a bank in a world where aggregate liquidity 
shocks are low probability, see Diamond and Rajan (2001). 6 
 
  At date 1, banks face a liquidity shock with probability q , where a fraction  f of their depositors 
withdraw.  We will be more explicit about the sources of this shock later. Depositors demand cash (they 
cannot trade in the financial asset market and will not accept the asset in lieu of cash
4). The bank will 
have to sell some of its asset for cash to meet this liquidity demand. The bank can raise money in 
anticipation of the shock by selling assets at date 0 for  0 P  per unit of date-2 face value, or it can sell 
assets, after the shock has been realized at date 1, for  1 P  per unit of date-2 face value.  Note that if the 
liquidity shock does not hit at date 1, the bank will not part with the asset at that date for a per unit price 
less than 1.     
We will describe how the price and trading are determined at date 0, given the date-1 price, first 
when the bank remains solvent when the liquidity shock hits (or if it has unlimited liability) and then 
when it becomes insolvent given the shock and has limited liability. We will show that trading can dry up 
at date 0 in the latter case.  
Prices and Trading with Banks that are Solvent Given the Shock 
  Let us assume there are buyers who are not subject to liquidity shocks (such as banks with more 
liquid assets or longer term liabilities, private equity, or Warren Buffet) who can buy at date 1 after the 
shock hits, paying cash. The buyer is indifferent between buying at either date if the price gives him the 
same expected date 2 payoff per dollar spent, so long as the return is greater than the return on cash (so 


















4 Depositors could be thought of as unsophisticated and hence unable to accept or trade mortgage backed securities 
or bank loans. 7 
 
Now consider the bank’s decision on when to sell. If the bank postpones any sale until after the shock has 




  . If  1 1   , 
then the bank would be insolvent and unable to raise  fD.  For now, we assume that it is either solvent or 
it has unlimited liability, so it can raise the necessary amounts (potentially from its other assets) to pay 
withdrawing depositors and the depositors who stay till date 2.    The payoff from selling at date 1 with 
probability q is      1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) qZ f D q Z D      , which on substituting for  1   simplifies to 
1
1
(1 ) ZDq f D
P
 . 





 whenever it has to sell at 
date 1 for a price  1 1 P  , which happens with probability q. Alternatively, the bank can sell at date 0 for 
0 P and hold cash from date 0 to 1, to cover the case where it needs liquidity.  If it sells early on date 0, it 




  .  The bank’s payoff from selling just enough to meet 
the liquidity need is (note that with probability q  the proceeds of sale of the fraction  0   of the asset 
exactly pay off the  fD of deposits): 
    00 0 0 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) qZ f D q Z P Z D          
= 0
00 0
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
fD fD fD
qZ f D q Z P Z D
ZP ZP ZP
  






(1 ) Z Df D
P
  .                          (1.2) 8 
 





  up front with certainty, 
which includes the cost of raising cash even though there might be no actual need. The bank is indifferent 
between selling at date 0 and date 1 when 
01
11
(1 ) (1 ) fD qfD
PP











                  (1.3) 
This is also the bid price (see (1.1)), so both buyers and sellers are willing to trade on both dates so long 
as the date 0 price bears this relationship to the (yet-to-be-determined) date 1 price.  
We do not model any intrinsic benefit from trade at date 0 as opposed to date 1 so the equilibrium 
price at date 0 reflects the future prices that can prevail.  If we added some small and offsetting reasons 
for trade across banks and buyers, there would be active trading on both dates.   
Limited Liability, Fire sales, and No Trade 
We assumed above that the bank was solvent when it had to sell to meet the liquidity shock (or it 
had unlimited liability). What if the bank becomes insolvent conditional on the liquidity shock at date 1, 
and has limited liability?  Clearly, the banker will never sell at date 0 if he fails even after doing so. 
Intuitively, the banker, in maximizing the value of equity, will want to maximize the value of the bank’s 
assets conditional on survival. Since the bank survives only in the state with no liquidity shock, and 
because the asset pays off most when the banker holds it to maturity rather than if he sells it prematurely 
for a possibly discounted price  0 1 P  , the banker prefers to hold the asset rather than sell it.  9 
 
Now consider the case where the bank survives if it sells assets at date 0 for  0 P but it fails at date 
1 if the liquidity shock occurs because assets are sold at fire sale prices.
5   From our previous analysis, the 
bank is willing to sell at  0




(1 ) ( 1 ) ( ) ask Z Df D q Z D
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    , where the right hand is the bank’s expected payoff with no 





























. The bid price is less than the ask, that is, no asset is offered for sale at 







 . Simplifying, this condition is    1 (1 ) fDP Z f D  , 
which is satisfied if the bank is insolvent conditional on the liquidity shock at date 1 and not having sold 
assets at date 0. We have 
Proposition 1: If the bank is insolvent at date 1 conditional on the liquidity shock, it will never sell the 
asset at the bid price at date 0, even if by doing so it could remain solvent. No trade will take place for the 
asset at date 0.   
In sum, so long as the “fire sale” price of the asset is so low at date 1 so as to drive the bank into 
insolvency, and the date 0 price reflects that future fire sale price, there will be no trade at date 0 – the 
market will freeze up.  Intuitively, there is no point selling at date 0 for cash if the banker will not avoid 
                                                            
5 We can allow the bank debt to be bailed out by the deposit insurance corporation, so long as the banker/equity is 
wiped out (see later). 10 
 
failure at date 1 by doing so – the sale simply causes him to accept a discounted value for the asset in all 
states, including those in which he could hold it to maturity. Even if the banker could avoid failure doing 
so, he does so by making a transfer to the depositors in the state of the liquidity shock (from value he 
would have enjoyed if he held the asset to maturity in the state with no liquidity shock). Limited liability 
allows him to avoid having to make this transfer.  Since the date-0 ask price when the bank is always 
solvent is exactly equal to the bid price, the date-0 ask price, if the bank is insolvent conditional on the 
shock and enjoys limited liability, has to be higher for the selling bank to be indifferent between selling 
and not. Hence no trade will occur. 
The underlying intuition is a combination of an aggregate liquidity shortage leading to fire sale 
prices (Allen and Gale (2004), Diamond and Rajan (2005)), and risk shifting (Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)) or underinvestment (Myers (1977)). The banker focuses on the value he will get conditional on 
the bank surviving. Rather than selling at the date-0 illiquid value, which transfers some of the value of 
the proceeds to the depositors (akin to the Myers debt overhang problem), he would rather focus on 
preserving value in the survival states by holding on to the illiquid asset to maturity (akin to the Jensen 
and Meckling risk shifting problem). The risk shifting incentives of the banks make them unwilling to sell 
the assets because they will be giving up their option to put the assets to the debt holders at a low price 
conditional on the liquidity shock – or put differently, they will pay for insurance against default in some 
states without benefiting enormously from surviving in those states.   
Note that from the banker’s perspective, a sale of assets is equivalent to a sale of stock for cash. 
For the same reason that the bank will not sell assets for cash, it will not sell stock for cash given the 
prevailing prices in the market place. This is a form of underinvestment (Myers (1977), Ivashina and 
Scharfstein (2008)) whereby the bank will not issue stock because of the value transfer that goes to debt 11 
 
in states of insolvency, but it stems not from uncertain fundamental values but from the potentially low 
future (and low current) fire sale prices at which illiquid assets will have to be sold.
6 
  In sum then, as expectations of date-1 liquidity fall so that the bank is insolvent conditional on the 
future shock, date-0 trading spontaneously dries up. Our model suggests then that distressed banks hold 
on to illiquid assets instead of selling them because they believe the price of the asset will be much higher 
in the future, conditional on their own survival.  
II. The Sources of Illiquidity 
Thus far, we have not described how the price  1 P is determined  Clearly, this is critical to our 
analysis, for without a low  1 P  there would be no illiquidity or potential insolvency at date 1, and no 
market freeze at date 0. Let the weight of the potentially “illiquid” banks we have described so far be 
normalized to 1. We will now distinguish between securities and loans on the bank’s portfolio, which will 
add richness to our analysis, and will not qualitatively affect our previous analysis. Let fraction  of each 
bank’s assets be composed of the financial security we have described so far. Let fraction (1 )   of its 
assets be loans with face value Z maturing at date 2. We will assume these loans can be recalled by the 
bank at date 1 – borrowers will then have to liquidate projects to repay the bank, so as a short hand, we 
will say that banks liquidate loans. The bank’s loan portfolio has differing liquidation values, with the 
range uniformly distributed between 0 and Z, that is, loans can be liquidated for values ranging from 
nothing to full face value. The possibility of liquidating loans gives the bank an alternative source of 
liquidity, in addition to selling financial assets.  We assume loans cannot be sold at date 0 (they have little 
                                                            
6 An oft mentioned rationale for why banks hold on to illiquid assets rather than selling them is the notion that their 
prices will go up in expectation.  Indeed, it is easily shown that the price of the asset does rise in expectation so that 
01 (1 ) Pq P q   . However, this is merely an artifact of Jensen’s inequality and the need for returns to equalize 
over different horizons.  12 
 
value in another lender’s hands) nor can they be recalled immediately (the borrower has no cash after 
investing at date 0).  
 Liquid buyers (private equity, hedge funds, and liquid banks) can purchase the financial asset at 
either date, and start with   in cash at date 0. Assume for simplicity that they are equity financed. Also, 
let these buyers also have the possibility of making term loans to industrial firms. If R is the date-2 return 
on a dollar lent at date 0, let the available volume of loans returning greater than or equal to R be  () I R , 
with  (1) I I  ,  () 0 IR   ,  () 0 IR    when  1 R  . Loans made by liquid banks return nothing at date 1, 
though at the cost of additional unneeded complexity, we could assume a somewhat higher date 1 return.  
Liquid buyers can store any excess funds at date 0 at a rate of 1. The timeline is 
              |----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------| 
Date 0 
Illiquid bank sells securities 
(or not). Liquid buyers buy 
securities, make loans, and 
hold cash. 
Date 1 
Liquidity shock hits (or not) and  
depositors withdraw from banks. Banks 
decide loans they want to liquidate. Banks 
sell securities and buyers buy with cash. 
Date 2 
Loans and securities pay off. 
Banker consumes proceeds 
after paying deposits. Buyers 
consume. 
Fire Sales and Lending 
Let us now derive prices. At date 0, the implied interest rate on term loans has to match the return 









. Intuitively, the long term effective interest rate, and thus the extent of long term lending, is 
determined by the price of financial assets in the market. 
Similarly, conditional on the liquidity shock at date 1, the illiquid bank will liquidate any loan at 
date 1 with liquidation value greater than  1 PZ before it sells any securities. This means the total value of 13 
 












  . Again, the implied interest rate used to judge 




, which depends on the price of financial assets, and hence 
available liquidity, on that date.  
If  I fD   , then  01 1 PP  , there is no illiquidity, all industrial projects are funded, and no 
loans are liquidated. The asset will trade for full face value Z at all times. But if   I fD   , the asset 
will trade at a discount to face value. For the banks’ date-1 needs for cash to be met, it must be that   












   

 (1.4) 
Equation (1.4) incorporates the first order condition for optimal loan liquidation by banks at date 1 and for 
optimal lending by buyers at date 0, given that the securities are sold for all of the date 1 cash possessed 
by buyers, and that this, together with loan liquidation, provides sufficient liquidity to meet the liquidity 










. Substituting in (1.4), we can solve 
for the single unknown,  1 P .  Note that  1 P  is determined by the bank’s need to recall enough loans to meet 
the aggregate demand for liquidity. Two conditions have to hold for (1.4) to be the equation determining 
1 P  : (1) the bank is solvent  (2) the bank can actually raise fD in total at those prices. When the bank does 
not sell any securities at date 0, the necessary condition for solvency is  
      
2
11 1 1 1 11 1 ( 1 )
2
Z
PZP P PZ f DP fD           (1.5) 14 
 
The first term on the left hand side of (1.5) is the value of the loans that it has not liquidated, the second 
term is the amount collected from liquidated loans, and the third term is the value of securities held. The 
first term on the right hand side is the value of deposits to be paid out while the second term is the value 
of deposits withdrawn. So long as (1.5) is met, the bank will be solvent even if it sells more securities at 
date 0 (because  01 PP  ).  
As  1 P  falls, it becomes harder to meet the solvency constraint – asset illiquidity leads to 
insolvency as in Diamond and Rajan (2005). If the potential liquidity demand f and bank debtD are very 
high or the available cash liquidity net of industrial demand,  I   , low, so that (1.5) is not met, then the 
bank will be insolvent when the illiquidity shock hits and trading will cease at date 0. 





  . Equation (1.4) assumes that the bank can meet the liquidity demand by selling financial assets 
and liquidating loans with rate of return equal to that of selling a loan.  This requires: 





ZP fD P      (1.6) 
For now, assume this condition is met.  If (1.6) holds as a strict inequality, then only a fraction of 
securities would be sold at date 1.  We have 
Lemma 2:  (i) An increase in potential liquidity demand, f , or bank debt,D, as well as a decrease in the 
relative size of liquid entities,  , will lead to a lower current and future expected price of the long dated 
asset Z. (ii) An increase in the probability of the liquidity shock, q, will lead to a decrease in the date 0 
price  0 P and an increase in the date 1 price 1 P .  (iii) If there is a 
R f f  at which all sales of the long 
dated asset Z cease at date 0, then ceteris paribus, there will be no sales for any 
R f f  . If there is a 15 
 
R DD  at which all sales of the long dated asset Z cease at date 0, then ceteris paribus, there will be no 
sales for any 
R DD  . If there is a 
R    at which all sales of the long dated asset Z cease at date 0, 
then ceteris paribus, there will be no sales for any 
R    . 
Proof:  See Appendix. 
The intuition behind Lemma 2 (i) is straightforward. Turning to lemma 2 (ii), an increase in the 
probability of the liquidity shock will make the returns to holding cash to buy assets at date 1 higher, so 
the date 0 price of the asset has to fall. In turn, however, this implies less lending, so more cash will be 
available to meet the liquidity demand, and the date 1 price of the asset will rise. Therefore the higher the 
probability of illiquidity, the greater the precautions the system takes against it, and less the chance of 
individual failure conditional on the shock. Lemma 2 (iii) suggests that as expected liquidity conditions 
deteriorate, there will eventually be a “sudden stop” in date 0 trading as banks become insolvent 
conditional on the liquidity shock.  
Proposition 2: An increase in potential liquidity demand, f , the face value of bank debt,D,or  the 
probability of the liquidity shock, q, as well as a decrease in the relative size of liquid entities,  , will 
lead to a reduction in date-0 lending. 
Proof:  Lending increases in  0 P .   0 P  decreases in , , and  f Dq and increases in   from lemma 2. Hence 
the proposition. Q.E.D. 
As the returns to buying illiquid assets increases, date-0 lending slows. Indeed, if date-0 trading in 
the long dated asset halts, liquid buyers may have plenty of cash on their balance sheet which is not being 
lent, in anticipation of buying assets cheaply at a date-1 fire sale. To the outsider politician, this may seem 
excessive caution (after all, the liquid buyers have no fear of liquidity shocks), and they may want to 
mandate more date-0 lending for the liquid buyer.  However, as we have argued, this could well be a 16 
 
rational equilibrium phenomenon where potential lenders in effect demand a premium for locking up their 
money. 
Illiquid Banks 
  Now let us turn to the bank’s liquidity condition (1.6) – that by selling all of its liquid securities, it can  
raise enough to provide the additional cash it needs at date 1 to meet the liquidity demand by depositors 
(after it liquidates all loans with returns less than or equal to the return from selling securities). If this 
condition is not satisfied, then the bank will have to sell all the securities it has,  Z  , for all the cash 











Now the bank will have recall more loans than specified in (1.4) to meet the remaining cash short fall, and 




. This will reduce 
the bank’s solvency. If    1 1
2
Z
ZP fD    , the bank cannot meet the demands of its depositors even 
after selling all securities and recalling all loans. It is then illiquid as well as insolvent.  
Bank runs and Inefficiency 
  Our focus thus far has been on explaining why the market for specialized assets with limited 
liquidity possessed by buyers can freeze and how this effects other lending.  We have ignored any 
efficiency consequences of bank insolvencies, fire sales, or credit contractions. Provided there are no 
externalities from lending (that is, surplus generated by a borrower that the lender does not internalize), 17 
 
fire sales when banks are solvent do not produce inefficient outcomes.
7  They are simply a way liquidity 
is obtained from buyers and transferred to those claimants on the bank who need liquidity.  The expected 
payment from buyer to seller is independent of whether the trade is at date 0 or 1.  However, insolvency 
will precipitate a run on the bank. This will cause the bank sell all its securities for the available cash in 
the market, and to recall all its loans regardless of their liquidation value, a source of significant 
inefficiency. 
An Example 









  . Given these 
parameters,  0 P =0.354,  1 P =0.0988 and the amount of date 0 lending is 0.215. The bank could sell just 
24% of its securities holdings at date 0, not sell any securities at date 1, and be solvent. However, if it 
does not sell any at date 0, it will find it has to sell 86 percent of its securities portfolio at the depressed 
price conditional on the liquidity shock, and will become insolvent. Yet it prefers not to sell, because the 
value of equity is higher conditional on no sale than conditional on the date-0 sale, for reasons we have 
explained.   
In Figure 1, we plot date 0 and date 1 security prices as we vary the amount of available cash with 
liquid buyers,  . At levels of   below 0.32, the banks will fail conditional on the liquidity shock, and 
will be run. Securities prices are low and lending even lower. Interestingly, an increase in liquidity from 
0.29 to 0.3 makes little difference in prices or lending because it does not alter the fact that the bank will 
be run, and that the date-1 fire sale prices conditional on the shock will be very low, so date-0 prices will 
be low.  
                                                            





However, if enough liquidity is infused into the system so that the bank is not insolvent at date1, 
securities prices are considerably higher at date 1 and date 0, and consequently, date-0 lending (see Figure 
2) jumps.  
In sum then, the private sector bank does not internalize the consequences of its own illiquidity 
and failure on future economy-wide liquidity conditions, on future available returns, and thus on current 
required returns and lending today. While the bank could sell today and avoid future failure (and the 
spillovers from its failure to the price of securities as well as to interest rates), it prefers not to,  focusing 
instead on maximizing value in the future states in which it expects to survive.  
Key Assumptions of the Basic Model 
It may be useful to discuss our key assumptions. We have referred to the bank’s required need at 
date 1 of fD of cash as a liquidity shock, without specifying the source.  It could be a need by depositors 
for working capital for their own businesses during a period of limited liquidity, or represent a fear-based 
withdrawal by some (uninsured) depositors or other short-term creditors who come to doubt the bank’s 
viability.  One example is the loss of access to interbank loan markets where other banks anticipate future 
problems with the bank and prefer to collect before the bank fails or is closed (as in Smith (1991)).  
Diamond-Rajan (2005) provides a general equilibrium model of this type of run-based withdrawals with a 
shortage of liquidity, stressing the two-way causality between illiquidity and insolvency.    
  The key contractual element that can lead to a fire sale is that short-term debt can be withdrawn 
(or committed lines of credit can be drawn down) before the assets mature.  If there was no possibility of 
needing to sell assets before date 2, then the market values of the assets would not be depressed by forced 
fire sales and as a result there would be no risk of insolvency.  With no insolvency, the market would not 
freeze.  20 
 
  In our model, banks refuse to sell at date 0 as soon as there is any possibility they might default. 
If there were some frictional reasons for trade (for example, some buyers are willing to buy at a slightly 
higher price than the bid price we calculate), then there would be some trade at date 0 if banks expect to 
be solvent at date 1 or if the probability of bank insolvency were very small (the benefits would exceed 
the small value of the put foregone), but not if the probability becomes higher.  If the chance of receiving 
a liquidity shock that causes insolvency varies across otherwise identical banks, we would see the extent 
of asset trade varying with the probability of the liquidity shock in a more continuous way.    
The assets are illiquid in our model because the set of (equally) informed buyers is limited and 
they have finite borrowing capacity (as in Shleifer and Vishny (1992)).
8 Hence buying capacity, rather 
than asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers of assets, drives our results. Of course, over 
time we would expect that if there were substantial quantities of illiquid assets, more potential buyers 
would acquire the necessary skills. So illiquidity of this kind would, at best, be a medium term 
phenomenon. 
  Term lending (as opposed to overnight lending) would be curtailed so long as such lending is 
done by either the illiquid banks or the potential buyers of their assets. In other words, it is because of the 
future high expected cost of capital/rate of return for entities that suffer the liquidity shock, or can buy the 
illiquid assets, that today’s required rate of return is high and lending is depressed. For firms that can 
borrow from institutions outside this group (such as small firms borrowing from local financiers, who 
have no capacity to understand, and hence buy, the illiquid assets), lending would be less constrained. 
There are, of course, many channels through which illiquidity can spill into the rest of the economy – the 
inter-bank market would be one channel.   
                                                            
8 The notion is that any buyers outside the set of the skilled would find it hard to tell the few bad securities from the 
majority of good ones, and could well face a substantial lemons problem if they tried to buy.  21 
 
  Finally, we have assumed banks’ cost of funding does not vary if they do or do not sell assets.  
Implicit in this is the assumption that bank depositors do not have the expertise to trade the illiquid asset, 
and as a result changes in the expected return offered in secondary markets available to banks do not lead 
them to change the interest rates offered to depositors.  Also, we assume that when a bank subject to 
liquidity shocks sells assets early and reduces the default risk to depositors, the deposit rate does not fall -
- This is based on our assumption that banks have a local monopoly over deposits and depositors in-
elastically supply a fixed quantity of deposits at date 0 at the offered interest rate (normalized to 0) and do 
not demand additional compensation for greater default risk.   This assumption allows us to focus on the 
essential driving force of the model.   
More generally, the lack of full adjustment of the bank’s cost of funding to asset sales arises when 
one portion of bank debt (such as insured deposits, or deposits which might, ex-post, end up being 
insured, or existing long-term debt as in Myers (1977)) is relatively insensitive to bank actions, while 
another portion of debt (such as overnight borrowing, uninsured demand deposits, and cash in brokerage 
accounts) is sensitive to the bank’s health and susceptible to run. The unwillingness to sell which causes 
the freeze occurs even if all deposits are insured, as long as the bank’s equity value is wiped out when the 
liquidity shock makes it insolvent.  The implications would be qualitatively similar.  
III. Two Extensions 
Before we move to discussing interventions, let us discuss two possible extensions. The first is to 
allow heterogeneity in the exposure to the liquidity shock.  
3.1.  Heterogeneity in the Shock 
Suppose the probability of the aggregate liquidity shock is q as before, but conditional on a liquidity 
shock, each bank ihas a probability  1
i    of getting the shock. Assume further that the fraction of banks 22 
 
that get a shock, conditional on the shock occurring, is constant – there is no aggregate uncertainty 
conditional on the shock.  
  One might expect that banks with a lower anticipated exposure to the shock might require a 
higher price to sell at date 0 – after all, they are less likely to need liquidity. Simple algebra suggests, 
however, that if banks remain solvent given the shock, the probability of the shock does not affect the 
price they ask for the asset. As before, therefore, the bid and ask prices are identical when there is no 
insolvency. The intuition is interesting. The ask price at date 0 that we computed earlier in (1.3) fully 
compensated banks for the cost of selling early and having spare liquidity if the aggregate shock does not 
hit. In addition, the ability to reinvest spare date-0 cash at the low security price 1 P , conditional on the 
aggregate shock, fully compensates them for having spare liquidity at date 0 and having the aggregate but 
not the bank-specific shock hit. This is why the size of the idiosyncratic shock does not matter if banks 
are solvent.  
But if banks are insolvent conditional on the shock hitting (that is, if 

2
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      ), 
i   does determine the size of 
the put option. Noting that if a bank survives at the ask price that gives it the incentive to forego its put 
option, the bank will sell all its securities at date 0, and not just enough to meet the liquidity shock, we 
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If the bank is insolvent conditional on the liquidity shock in the absence of any sales at date 0, the 
numerator increases in 
i  . Hence we have the ask price now increasing with the size of the idiosyncratic 
shock 
i  . 
Proposition 3: If banks have differing exposure 
i  to the aggregate liquidity shock, the ask price does not 
vary with 
i  if banks are solvent conditional on the liquidity shock hitting them, but increases in 
i  if they 
are insolvent conditional on the shock hitting them. 
  If there are reasons to trade at date 0, as mentioned at the end of the previous section, then the 
banks with the lowest probability of receiving a liquidity shock will be the most willing to trade at date 0.  
This has implications for government actions to eliminate a market freeze.  We discuss this in section IV. 
3.2. Risky vs Illiquid Assets  
Thus far, we have assumed that the illiquid assets have a value Z with certainty. This simplifying 
assumption creates some expositional difficulty, for it is hard to imagine then why the asset is illiquid, 
since anyone with cash could buy the asset and hold it to maturity. In particular, there would be no cost to 
the government of liquidity intervention, as long as the market price per unit of face value is less than 
one.  
One reason why the government could be reluctant to intervene is that the asset might require 
management (as with a bank loan), and the government may not have management capability. But this is 
not a plausible explanation for arm’s length mortgage backed securities. Another reason, and one we have 
relied on so far, is that only the specialist knows the value of the security or, equivalently, a fraction of the 
illiquid assets could be very poor in quality, so any casual buyer will end up with an adversely selected lot 
of securities (unless he buys the whole portfolio, which even the government may not have the funds to 
do). But a third reason, is there could be fundamental uncertainty about the asset’s value, which overlays 24 
 
(and is partly responsible) for its illiquidity. To analyze this, let us start by examining an asset whose 
value is uncertain, ignoring illiquidity for the moment, then bring back illiquidity.  
Risky assets 
  Suppose the date 2 value is not Z with certainty, but is Z with probability 1-q and  1 PZ Z   with 
probably q, where the date 1 value,  1 PZ , is now low because date 2 payments are expected to be low.  In 
this case, the asset is liquid and the gross rate of return from buying it at the low value at date 1 is the 
normal expected rate of return (one each period).  Of course, because the asset is risky, a bank that would 
fail if the lower asset value were realized at date 1 might still ask for a price at date 0 that exceeds the 
fundamental value of the asset, because it values the option to shift risk to lenders, as in Allen and Gale 
(2000b).   
 Note that the ask price required by the risky bank would be the same as derived for the base case 
earlier, because the bank’s payoff from not selling is (1-q)(Z-D) as before.  The bid price would be 
somewhat higher than the bid price we found earlier (because buyers require a gross rate of return of only 
1 in the future, implying that their highest bid would be the fundamental value of the asset, that is 
1 (1 ) qPZ q Z  >
Bid
o P ).    Because the hurdle rate for new date-0 lending would not be elevated by 
expectations of future fire sales, lending by potential buyers is normal.
9  Therefore, to explain both a 
general credit freeze, including few new loans by healthy unlevered buyers, and a freeze in securities 
markets, the fear of fire sales is, we believe, a more relevant model.  
Illiquid and Risky Assets  
  Adding the possibility that assets are illiquid, in addition to being risky, is straightforward, so we 
will not pursue it. There is though a final but subtle consequence of considering both illiquidity and risk at 
                                                            
9 This also means injecting future liquidity would have no effect on current or future asset prices.  The market would 
still be frozen.  25 
 
the same time. Suppose the realization of the fundamental value of Z %  conditional on the liquidity shock 
is either low, L Z , or high,  H Z , with expected value Z. At date 1 the available pool of liquidity will tend 
to bind more when asset prices are high – the departure from fundamental value will be greater because 




, for investors from purchasing at that time will be 
higher. As a result, using Jensen’s inequality, a mean preserving spread in the fundamental date-2 value 
of the asset, conditional on the liquidity shock, will result in an increase in the expected return to having 









The point of introducing an overlay of risk on our basic model of illiquidity was to show how 
illiquidity is fundamental to the point we have made. There are interesting interactions between illiquidity 
and risk, however, which deserve further exploration. 
IV.   Interventions 
There are several reasons that government regulators or central banks might consider intervening to 
eliminate the market freeze and even influence the market price.   
(i)  Interventions that force some banks to sell securities early can keep banks from being run and 
their assets being dumped on the market.  Interventions that reduce the fire sale pricing can have a 
similar effect. 
(ii)  The authorities may need a market price to help determine if the banks are solvent.  When Z is 
random, banks and expert buyers may know the long-run value of assets, Z, but the regulators 
may not know.  In addition, regulators may not know the amount of available liquidity,  . 
Therefore, useful valuation information can be obtained about both fundamental values and 
expected liquidity conditions by unfreezing the market. Note that illiquidity would depress the bid 
price below fundamentals, while the put option, stemming from both illiquidity and risky 
fundamentals, could elevate the ask price, even above fundamental value.  
(iii)  An intervention that reduces the fire sale pricing can increase the flow of credit from potential 
buyers and sellers, both at date 0 (new loans) and at date 1 (reduce unnecessary liquidation of old 
loans). 
Possible interventions include forcing distressed institutions’ to sell, paying enough to induce 
voluntary sales to the authorities, increasing the capacity and incentive of potential buyers to buy 
distressed assets, providing liquidity directly to banks, or removing the overhang of distressed institutions 27 
 
by recapitalizing or closing them. In any intervention, the authorities may be handicapped by not knowing 
the fundamental value of assets themselves. In what follows, we examine various interventions and the 
insights offered by the model on their likely costs and benefits.  
Forced Date-0 Asset Sales 
  We argued earlier that because the security is illiquid, the bank may be insolvent conditional on 
the shock if it holds to sell at date 1. This, of course, makes it even more determined to hold the security 
till date 1. If, however, it sold the security at date 0, it would get a higher price and perhaps avoid default. 
To the extent that this reduces the number of banks that are run at date 1 and that therefore sell all their 
securities into the market, it could also push up bid prices for the securities, and thus increase lending at 
both dates. Of course, banks that expect to fail conditional on the liquidity shock do not have an incentive 
to sell assets at date 0 at the price buyers are willing to pay, so sales will have to be forced by the 
government. We state the result for the standard case where the bank is liquid but insolvent.   
Theorem 4: Let  1 P be determined by (1.4), let the liquidity condition (1.6) hold, but let the bank be 
insolvent if it retains all its securities till date 1 so that (1.5) is violated.  
(i)  Then if there is an  0   with  0 (0,1]   such that 
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then all the banks can be made fail-safe by requiring them to sell  0   of their securities at date 0. 28 
 
(ii) If there is no  0   with  0 (0,1]   such that (1.9) and (1.10) are satisfied, then not all the banks 
can be saved through forced date-0 sales. The maximum fraction of  banks that can be saved 
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(iii) If no feasible solution exists to (ii), then the banking system cannot be prevented from failing 
through securities sales at date 0. 
(iv) If some banks can be saved from failing through securities sales at date 0, both  0 P  and 1 P  are 
higher (relative to the situation where all banks fail conditional on the shock), as are date 0 
and date 1 lending.   
Proof: Omitted 
   The reason a forced sale at date 0 could contribute to bank solvency is that the sales price pools 
the value of the security across future states (buyers essentially provide the bank insurance). So the bank 
is worth more conditional on the liquidity shock if it sold at date 0 than it would be worth if it did not sell 
and got hit by the liquidity shock. Indeed, the price of the security conditional on the shock is also now 
higher because failed banks do not now depress the price by dumping all their securities on the market. 
This implies that the sale at date 0 also fetches a higher price.  29 
 
  One problem, of course, may be that the value of securities that have to be sold at date 0 to ensure 
bank solvency may exceed the available cash with buyers -- (1.10) may not hold. This may occur even if 
the available cash, coupled with loans that are liquidated by the bank at date 1, is enough to meet the 
needs of depositors – i.e., even if there is enough liquidity to meet the demands of depositors. In this case, 
only a fraction  of banks can then be saved through sales at date 0. Of course, these banks may now 
have excess liquidity even when hit with the liquidity shock, and can use the excess to purchase securities 
cheaply from other firms.  Finally, forced asset sales will not work if there is little cash with buyers (so 
securities prices are low and solvency cannot be assured) or if the probability of the liquidity shock is 
high (so selling at date 0 does not add much to the value).  
  Another interesting case, different from the one we have examined above, is one where the 
liquidity shock is so high, and therefore the date 1 price is so low, that a bank would need to sell all its 




 ((1.6) does not hold).    
Securities are priced to draw out all the cash in the market (and the price is determined by (1.7)).  We 
know that the bank would be insolvent at date 1 at this price (otherwise, it would have been willing to sell 
at date 0).  Interestingly, if the authorities force a sale at date 0, the date-0 price will be the cash-in-the-
market price – it will be based on the cash available to purchase securities, and not on the potentially 
higher expected value of the security given by (1.3) (which incorporates the higher value in the no-shock 









, which is the 
same as the date-1 price.  Even so, forced sales may help bank solvency – at the low cash-in-the-market 
date-0 price, P0, buyers will set aside more cash to purchase securities, thus boosting their date 0 price 
relative to the date 1 price that prevailed when date 0 sales were not mandated.  Forced sales produce a 30 
 





, who divert the proceeds to security purchases.  





 is large, will there be a benefit to forced sales.  





were unchanged at the lower P0, the equilibrium P0 would equal the P1 from 
(1.7) and the banks will be insolvent at date 0. This is the potential downside to forced sales when 
liquidity is in short supply. Because the forced date-0 sale makes sellers accept a cash-in-the market price, 
it will reduce their date-0 value beyond just the loss of the put option (and buyers will now get a windfall 
because the security will sell for lower than the value implied by date-1 returns without forced sales). If 
the authorities are mistaken about the extra available liquidity, forced sales would render banks insolvent 
at date 0, even if they were solvent at date 0 without the forced sale.     
Voluntary Sales to the Authorities  
Thus far, we have looked at forced sales. The authorities can offer to buy securities at date 0 at a 
price banks will voluntarily sell at, so as to establish securities prices, keep the securities off market in an 
entity like the Resolution Trust Corporation, and prevent some bank failures. The problem, however, is 
that a bank will sell only at or above the ask price given in (1.8), which depends on a given bank’s 
likelihood of receiving the liquidity shock, and which is above the private buyer’s bid price.
10   
So long as the magnitude of the purchase by the authorities is such as to not eliminate bank 
failure, the value of the put option of the marginal selling bank will determine the price that banks will set 
in a reverse auction (similar to that considered in the initial TARP program in the United States in 2008).   
                                                            
10 Unlike the private market, though, the authorities may be willing to tolerate some losses because they internalize 
the economy-wide positive spillovers from having a healthy, functioning, financial sector. The losses could take the 
form of rents needed to ensure incentive-compatibility for buyers that can acquire the asset on their behalf, subsidies 
to induce banks to sell and partly reveal the value of assets, or losses made in buying the illiquid assets or claims on 
the illiquid assets that the authorities do not have great expertise in. 31 
 
A reverse auction will provide a price, but if authorities are unsure of the motivation for the lack of selling 
(and do not know  ,,  o r  
i qf  ), it will not reveal the value of Z to them. Three additional features of the 
reverse auction are clear. 
(i)  If there are banks with different exposures to the liquidity shock, the banks with the lowest value 
of the put option (the lowest exposure to the liquidity shock) would agree to sell at the lowest 
price (this is from expression (1.14)) . 
(ii)  Conditional on agreeing to sell, they would want to sell all their securities, since at any price over 
the bid price, selling and reinvesting conditional on the liquidity shock beats holding to 
maturity.
11 If these selling banks were banned from repurchasing the illiquid security if they did 
not receive a liquidity shock on date 1, they would demand a higher price for parting with it at 
date 0. 
(iii)   The price at which banks will sell will increase with the amount of money the government puts 
into purchasing assets – because the fewer the assets left with the banks after the reverse auction, 
the lower the date-1 price discount conditional on the liquidity shock (this is assuming that the 
cash the authorities put into purchasing is additional to that in the hands of private buyers). At the 
same time, the price will also approach the price private buyers will pay because a higher date-1 
price will eliminate the possibility of failure and hence the put option. Interestingly, therefore, 
government purchases can restart an illiquid private market at a higher price. Note that if date-1 
illiquidity is not the problem but the problem is low fundamentals, the price will not move 
regardless of the amount the government puts in.  
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Liquidity infusion 1: Lend to liquid buyers at date 0 or date 1. 
We have already examined one form of liquidity infusion, which is for the government to buy 
assets directly. An alternative is for it to lend to liquid buyers at date 0 or date 1, thus augmenting   and 
boosting prices (see lemma 2). Buyers certainly have the expertise to value the assets, the real issue being 
whether they have the incentives to use government financing in a reasonable way. Some rents/subsidies 
may have to be offered to them to give them the incentive to use their expertise on behalf of the 
government.  To the extent that buyers get these subsidies only if they purchase assets, they may have an 
incentive to pay for the put options banks hold. Note that if the government has insured depositors, and 
cannot avoid illiquidity induced failures, the subsidy to buyers, which is passed on to banks, reflects the 
(perhaps unwise) commitments it has taken through deposit insurance (though, as discussed above, the 
government can reduce the put by forcing banks to sell securities). The subsidy is more questionable if the 
bank is insolvent, or if the banks are significantly funded through uninsured deposits.  
Liquidity infusion 2: Lend to the banks at date 1 
An apparently straightforward solution to the problem of a fire sale at date 1 is to lend freely to 
the banks experiencing liquidity withdrawals.  If the government could commit to do this on a sufficiently 
large scale, which would require it to value the banks’ assets at date 1, the illiquid pricing would be 
eliminated as would be the date 0 market freeze.  However, if as we argue in section 3.1, regulators are 
unsure about the asset values (Z), they would be unsure if they were providing liquidity or participating in 
a bail out. If the public believed, rightly or wrongly, that lending was a bail out, it might be unwilling to 
support it. As a result, it might be difficult for the authorities to commit to unconditional date-1 liquidity 
support at date 0, preventing them from ending the freeze. 
Close Some Banks at Date 0 33 
 
  If there is insufficient liquidity for all banks to survive the liquidity shock, then all will be run and 
all will fail if each waits until date 1 to sell assets.  There might be sufficient liquidity for some to survive 
if the others are closed and their assets taken “off market”. 
  If banks are insolvent, the authorities can close them (if the banks are not “too big to fail”). To 
use solvency as a basis to close banks, the authorities will have to determine the value of assets, for which 
they will either need to generate a market price or they will have to hire experts to value the assets.
12 They 
will also have to hold the illiquid assets in some holding entity (similar to the Resolution Trust 
Corporation) and sell them over time once the likelihood of the liquidity shock falls. Closure thus allows 
the authorities to remove the overhang of illiquid assets, and bring down required rates of return, but it 
does not absolve them of the need to value assets or pump in resources (to finance the holding entity).   
  The problem comes when the banks appear solvent today and thus cannot be failed, but could 
become insolvent in the future – as in our model. Closure may not be an option for the “walking 
wounded”. It may also not be an option for the banks that are difficult to fail for a variety of reasons. 
Recapitalization 
  If the authorities are willing to infuse capital they could help when the problem is primarily one 
of solvency (if when date 1 interest rates go high enough to generate enough liquidity from calling loans 
to meet depositor withdrawals, the bank is insolvent). Indeed, this is the situation in our initial example. 
If, for instance, the authorities were willing to give the bank bonds of value 0.018 at date 1 that would pay 
                                                            
12 A market price will be sufficient to value assets held on the books so long as there are easily observable and 
verifiable characteristics that put the traded assets in the same equivalence class as the book assets – e.g., mortgage 
backed securities based on sub-prime mortgages originated by A in new development B in city C. If, however, there 
are still intrinsic differences between assets that require expertise (mortgages originated in the south-side of the 
development have different default characteristics than those originated in the north side, and only south side 
mortgages are traded), then there is no alternative to hiring experts.   34 
 
off at date 2, they could save the bank from being run. This would increase the date-1 security price above 
the “run” price, and increase lending at date 0.  
  A commitment to inject capital as needed to keep the bank from failing does create moral hazard 
because the bank will be bailed out no matter how poorly it does. Moreover, this intervention does not 
induce the banker to sell securities early (because the banker knows his stake will be severely diluted 
even if the bank is rescued, and thus his down side payoff is very low,  much as the situation where he is 
run). It does keep some assets off the market by preventing a run, and hence boosts securities prices, and 
thus lending. Indeed, the stress tests conducted by the U.S. government on 19 large banks in May 2009 
might have been interpreted as a signal that the government would stand behind the banks regardless of 
their eventual loss levels. This eliminated the possibility of a large bank failure, and began the process of 
raising the prices of illiquid assets 
V. Related Literature  
  Some recent work has explained market freezes by appeals to asymmetric information, along the 
lines of the original insight of Ackerlof (1970).  Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2008) and Heider, 
Hoerova and Holthausen ( 2009) present interesting models of securities sales based on private 
information of existing banks about the value of their assets. For example, in Bolton, Santos, and 
Scheinkman (2008), long horizon investors cannot tell whether short horizon investors sell because they 
need liquidity or because they have adverse information about asset quality. This leads to a price discount, 
which gets worse over time because the potential seller gets to know more about the asset. The seller thus 
has to decide whether to sell now in response to a liquidity need, or to attempt to ride out the crisis with 
the possibility of selling in the future at a much greater discount. There are both immediate trading 
equilibria and late trading equilibria, with the latter resembling our trading freeze. The clear difference in 
our model is the assumption of no information asymmetry within the set of buyers and sellers.  35 
 
  Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2009) show that borrowing freezes can arise when the 
information structure in the market shifts from one where the arrival of no news is good news (and the 
asset price goes up) to one where the arrival of no news is bad news (and the asset price goes down). In 
the latter situation, the borrowing capacity of a bank may be very low when it intends to roll over its 
borrowing repeatedly. The shift in information structure in the market can, therefore, cause lending to 
banks to dry up. Our paper explains, by contrast, why long term lending to industry, where there is no 
rollover risk, can also dry up.  
Allen, Carletti and Gale (2009) present a model of freezes without asymmetric information, with 
limited liquidity as we assume, but without any risk of default.  The market freezes there when there is 
ample liquidity but most of the liquidity risk is systematic rather than bank specific.  The interbank 
market freezes because each bank wants to hold liquidity on its balance sheet rather than to borrow or 
lend it when nearly all banks will borrow or lend (rather than take offsetting positions).  
  There are closely related studies of aggregate liquidity shortages.  Diamond-Rajan [2005] model 
contagious bank failures due to limited aggregate liquidity.  In their model, there is both individual bank 
risk about the proportion of their loans that generate liquid repayments quickly and aggregate uncertainty 
about the supply of liquidity.  The potential failure of enough banks forces banks to call in bank-specific 
loans.  Banks choose to increase interest rates to attempt to attract deposits from other banks, and this can 
bring down all other banks when liquidity is too low.  The model assumes that the deposit market is 
competitive and that all assets, including bank deposits and short-term debt, must offer the same return as 
the loans that banks make.  The model we present in this paper has similar features, except we assume 
that deposit markets are local monopolies (or at least require a lower return than bank assets, and the 
return does not move one for one with returns in asset markets).  The effect of limited liquidity is via the 
price of banks’ tradable assets, which affects the rate of return expected in the market over time, and thus 
lending. 36 
 
  Our paper is also related to Shleifer and Vishny (2009), where banks expand and contract lending 
based on their ability to securitize loans in a sentiment driven market. In their model, parameters are 
assumed such that banks would not want to hoard cash in order to buy assets when market sentiment falls. 
This then drives the pro-cyclicality of lending. However, banks would hoard securities and not sell them 
at such times, in anticipation of a recovery in prices. Our rationale for why banks hoard securities is 
different, since there are buyers in our market who are not infected by negative sentiment. The reason in 
our model is that banks prefer the higher return they get conditional on survival by holding on to the 
asset, to the lower unconditional return they get from selling.  
  The model of illiquid asset markets where prices are set by the quantity of liquidity in the market 
is closely related to that used in Bhatacharya-Gale (1987) and Allen-Gale (1998, 2003).  This is related, 
yet somewhat different from the model of liquidity in Holmstrom-Tirole (1998), which relies on collateral 
value as the limit to liquidity of an asset, rather than limited purchasing power.   
  Finally, our paper is related to Phillipon and Schnabl (2009). Unlike our paper, they treat the 
problem of credit contraction in a crisis as primarily due to a debt overhang faced by banks as in Myers 
(1977). Our focus on the institutional overhang of distressed institutions is clearly different. 
Conclusion   
While our model is simple, it offers a way to think about the problems that ail any financial market and 
lending in a crisis. The simple message is that in a crisis, credit is unlikely to flow freely unless the 
problem of institutional overhang is dealt with – unless the solvency of illiquid institutions is assured, or 
the illiquid assets they hold are moved to entities that will not unload them quickly. The task of the 
authorities is to facilitate such a clean-up at minimum cost to the taxpayer. We have suggested some 
possible interventions that could be effective. More work is clearly needed to understand the links 
between solvency, liquidity, and lending better.  37 
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Proof of Lemma 2; 
We sketch the proof when the change in parameters does not cause a change in whether the bank defaults 
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 which is negative since the denominator is negative. Similarly, we 
can show 
11 0 and  0
dP dP
dD d










, lemma 2 (i) follows. (ii) Ceteris paribus, an 
increase in q leads to a decrease in  0 P . From (1.4), this must imply that  1 P  will increase in equilibrium, 
since liquid buyers will lend less and store more cash. (iii) The condition for all sales to cease is that the 
bank ceases to be solvent. The solvency condition is given by (1.5), which on simplifying is 
11 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
22
Z Z
PP Z D f D P  
              
. This is clearly satisfied if  1 1 P  , so long as 
DZ  . As  f increases,  1 P  falls, from lemma 2 (i). So the right hand side of the inequality increases, 
while the left hand side falls. Hence provided the bank fails for some 
R f , it should fail for all 
R f f  . 
The other conditions follow similarly.  Q.E.D. 
 
 
 